MERGING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): A STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE
The events of September 11, 2001 taught us that weak states like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states………We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone."
1 These words were used by President Bush in announcing his signature to the National Security Strategy that was released on 17 September 2002. In this 31 page document that covers the security environment through which the United States must navigate in a dangerous world, the 'weak state like Afghanistan' was referenced several times. International involvement in this nation since the US bombing campaign prosecuted shortly after the 911 attacks has evolved in the past four years but the guiding principle has remained the same; namely, stability. How stability in Afghanistan is to be achieved is open to a broad range of interpretations defined by the filters of national political agendas of each nation currently working in that part of the world. For the United States, the issue of an Afghanistan that can become a terrorist haven once again still looms large, but there are other issues, such as the continuing involvement of US personnel in Iraq, that make the continued high-intensity involvement of US personnel in Afghanistan difficult. An answer to this issue is the involvement of other nations under various organizations to increase the size and depth of their efforts in Afghanistan. Still, the US does not want to relinquish its influence, access and indeed control of efforts in the region. US goals in Afghanistan are broad and clear: root out Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, prevent their return, support self-governance, and ensure security, stability and reconstruction. To accomplish these goals, the United States and the international community are undertaking two major campaigns simultaneously. First, a military effort to kill or capture terrorist forces in Afghanistan, and second a political/civil effort to build a viable and secure state, with each campaign dependent upon the other's success.
Without an end to hostilities, reconstruction and governance will fail. If reconstruction and governance fail, the resulting power vacuum could potentially allow a return of Al Qaeda and terrorist factions.
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One answer for the US desire to remain engaged but not so heavily invested in
Afghanistan is the merger of the US military effort, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the NATO military effort, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) into a single entity.
The merger of these two missions is a strategic imperative for the US policy in Afghanistan because it will do two things: maintain the US leadership and influence of international efforts in Afghanistan while allowing the US to reinvest assets currently committed in Afghanistan to other parts of the world. Recent discussions quoted in a number of open source publications reference the figure of 4,000 troops as an initial number of US military personnel that could potentially be withdrawn if international contributions in Afghanistan were increased. It can also be assessed that the north and northwestern portion of Afghanistan was already more stable and less likely to pose a combat risk to NATO forces operating in those areas. The plan was for an initial eight PRTs, the first of which was run by Germany in the northern city of One thing that must be restated often is that the United States is a member of NATO. 18 The US leadership role in NATO being stated, and the fact that the US is contributing forces to ISAF, the US is still prosecuting a unilateral combat operation in Afghanistan. What will be the impact on US operations, specifically OEF, if the merger of ISAF and OEF becomes a reality? Our own coalition doctrine describes a parallel command structure defined as "when two of more nations (this could also very easily apply to the NATO Alliance) combine to form a coalition and none of the nations are designated to take the lead, a parallel structure must be Affairs Fried has characterized this proposed command arrangement as "…we've made good progress in ways that satisfy everyone's fair interests." 21 The recent announcement by Secretary Rumsfeld and General Abizaid to reduce US forces in Afghanistan by 2,500 troops in 2006 illustrates the benefits derived from this 'greater efficiency' achieved through closer ISAF/OEF coordination. 22 The US Joint Staff J5 further highlighted this greater synergy with regard to further US troop reductions when he praised the international / NATO competence and contributions: "We're winning this, and it's because of their great effort that we're able to make these adjustments (US troop withdrawals in 2006) in cooperation with our friends the Afghans and with our friends from NATO." 23 As events in 2006 unfold, we will experience a closer 'linkage' between OEF and ISAF. The political realities, however, will laboriously prolong the eventual merger needed to achieve total unity. The political priorities in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) will continue to focus on language that address the political concerns in Paris and Berlin at the expense of greater military efficiency----not a totally new dynamic for NATO.
Yet as we witnessed in Kosovo, military expedients will eventually lead to greater clarity in the political discourse in all capitals resulting in greater synergy. In this one word, "stability," is the challenge and perhaps the answer in how to successfully merge ISAF and OEF into an effective international military force that will achieve the ends desired by both the US, which wants to create a stable Afghanistan and deny the state as a training ground for terrorists, and NATO which wants a stable and economically viable Afghanistan.
While both the US and NATO desire a stable Afghanistan, the methods in use to achieve that goal is at issue. Differing views, goals and ends of a merger might be problematic. In the past two years a great deal of dialogue has taken place between troop contributing nations concerning what type of operations would contribute to a stable Afghanistan. For the US, 'stability' has many definitions, but two of the methods to achieve that goal often make discussions with other troop contributing nations difficult; direct ground combat operations necessary to eliminate Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, and deliberate steps to eradicate poppy cultivation (broadly discussed as "counter narcotic" operations). NATO troop contributing nations have been reluctant to participate in direct ground combat operations and poppy eradication, focusing instead on the definition of 'stability' as a political outreach program with local tribal leaders.
These programs take the form of support to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and a longer view of investment in infrastructure support, building, education and commercial trade.
Many European leaders see a 'conflict of interest' because the hunt for terrorists will undermine ISAF's mission of reconstruction and assistance to the fledgling Karzai government in Kabul. 24 To the American mind this "conflict of interest" which concerns so many European capitals can be interpreted as "risk aversion." Why is it that European nations are so reluctant to commit their troops and use military force as an option? A full answer to this question could fill volumes, but the short answer is found in their long and often brutal histories of armed conflict over a period of 1000 years. Much of the senior leadership in Europe; be it political, business or military and those older generation members who vote, remember all to well that last use of their militaries which devastated them physically, morally and economically. This concern is imbedded so deeply in their national psyches that it is difficult for the American mind to comprehend the European aversion to the use of military force. As discussions continue within the NATO Alliance about the merger of ISAF and OEF, the US must be sensitive to this aspect of the European mind set.
The greatest challenge to the merger of ISAF and OEF will continue to be the collective European domestic will. There continues to be a general feeling amongst many Europeans that the US prosecution of the Global War on Terror has made the world a more dangerous place. other nations, the largest non-NATO nation being Australia, participating in international operations in Afghanistan, all of whom restrict participation in combat operations and limit their soldiers to self defense. Additionally, while poppy eradication is central not only to US policy in the region, but a stated national imperative for the Karzai government, most of the international forces operating in Afghanistan admonish local Afghani leaders not to cultivate poppies as a way of generating income, but take no overt actions to stop farmers from growing them.
The question that must be asked at this point is can the domestic political will in European states be altered to gain support for a military mission likely to involve combat operations? The answer to that question is yes and there is precedence to demonstrate that domestic political will can be brought to a point where involvement in the NATO operation is possible even though the mission is not wholly acceptable. NATO is a consensus organization which fully appreciates that it will be a rare occasion when all 26 member-nations will agree, in the same way, on a given situation. During the Kosovo crisis of 1999, many NATO nations opposed the bombing campaign in the skies over Serbia but were in support of providing aid to Kosovar refugees fleeing to Albania. Both aspects; bombing and humanitarian assistance, were part of the same mission prospectus of the NATO operation in the Balkans and Alliance members contributed money, supplies and capabilities for the mission as well as troops. National caveats were crafted to ensure that troops were operating under the NATO flag but constrained to those aspects of the mission for which the contributing nation could muster national domestic support.
Understanding this dynamic of a large Alliance makes the idea of "duality," where a nation can involve itself and its military in a mission largely found unpalatable by its domestic constituency, states must limit their actions to roles within that mission which can find broad based support on the domestic front. Nations understand that elected officials that strive to contribute troops to a mission for NATO eventually must stand for reelection and this flexibility (read "duality') within the Alliance allows for national political entities to marshal support for military missions. In the case of ISAF, a NATO nation can involve itself in direct combat operations or limit its participation to provincial reconstruction -all under the umbrella of a single command structure.
It will be a political and diplomatic challenge to combine all the troop contributing nations operating in Afghanistan under one command and control structure called ISAF. A possible template for successful merger of the two missions is already in effect in Baghdad, Iraq, with the NATO Training Mission -Iraq (NTM-I) where the term "duality" is the key to success. Although heavily criticized in European circles, the NTM-I concept of duality has proven to be a palatable solution for many European capitals opposed to using their forces in combat operations in Iraq.
This approach may also work when applied to the relationship of NATO forces in Afghanistan and a desire on the part of some NATO members to clearly separate themselves from US combat operations. This would mean that the NATO command and control umbrella would have both a provincial reconstruction (read: nation building) focus and as well as a direct ground combat focus along the same lines as the NTM-I in Iraq. Currently the plan is for overall NATO command to reside with the NATO subordinate operational formation, Joint Forces CommandBrunssum located in the Netherlands, commanded by a German four star general with his intheater chain-of-command being a rotational NATO HQ commander and two Deputy Commanders; one responsible for provincial reconstruction and the other for combat operations (most likely this would be a US or UK position).
To the American mind, the question of how to combine all the troop contributing nations operating in Afghanistan under one command and control structure called ISAF, allowing for some nations to prosecute a direct combat mission and other nations to pursue a more benign nation building role seems impossible where the military tenet of "unity of effort" reigns supreme.
But to NATO, the idea of "duality" to achieve the same end state prosecuted through multiple Jones has expressed concern with the intelligence sharing process when he said "most of the nations operating military forces in Afghanistan run their own intelligence-gathering centers.
Instead of sharing data, most work solely to support their own operations. As NATO takes responsibility, intelligence sharing will emerge as a prime concern." 33 The merger of the ISAF and OEF headquarters and their missions will not be easy but the desire to create more synergy between the two operations make this a strategic imperative that has a workable precedencesetting framework already employed by NATO in Iraq that can be used as an initial template.
The merger of ISAF and OEF will clearly be a significant challenge for NATO as the Alliance strives to achieve unity of command and unity of effort with two opposing methodologies for NATO forces with as many national agendas as countries participating in the mission. It is clear that the NATO Defense Ministers and military planners have yet to address the transatlantic differences to create a command structure designed to address all the concerns of the NATO allies. US military commanders are concerned that ISAF will be underequipped to handle their new combat mission. 34 These same military commanders are quick to point to the difficulties that NATO experienced when charged with operating the Kabul International Airport and could only land aircraft during the daylight hours, had difficulties in protecting the aircraft on the ground from being damaged by looters, and frequently could not repair aircraft that sat on the ground for weeks waiting for repair parts. Further, much of what NATO promised to provide to the airport sat at airfields all over Europe for months waiting on agreements to determine which countries would be responsible for the strategic lift necessary to send the pallets to Kabul. Close Air Support (CAS) that was promised for use by OEF if an emergency arose could not fly due to disagreements between the Royal Dutch Air Force planners and the Dutch Parliament that had yet to vote on whether or not Dutch pilots could fly combat missions. However, the new US Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland is quick to point out that "we do have a couple of allies who are not yet sure that they are ready to participate in the highest end of the counter-terrorism mission that U.S. forces and others are pursuing primarily now through Operation Enduring Freedom." Further, "I would say that as we talk to the NATO countries who are getting ready to deploy with us in the south --Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and a number of others --they all understand that the mission in the south is going to be manifestly more combat intensive than the mission in the north or the west has been. They are preparing for it very well." In Afghanistan, NATO is taking over more and more of the security responsibilities in the country, that is, the security responsibilities that are the problems, for now, of non-Afghans. Germany is playing a major role, with over 2,000 troops in the country. We very much appreciate that, and Germany is both in ISAF and OEF, which should not be forgotten. And NATO needs to do what it has offered to do, which is to expand its security presence. Now this is going to take greater capacity; it's going to take more coordination of the various contingents, and better coordination between ISAF and OEF, not a merger, but a kind of linkage and coordination between the two of them.
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Whether we define better synergy by 'linkage' or 'merger' it has now become clear that a politically palatable command arrangement between ISAF and OEF can be reached in Brussels to achieve unity of effort and unity of command. NATO Assistant Secretary General Reid goes on to say; "we've been working toward a kind of linkage in the command structure between ISAF and OEF which would achieve both the purposes of closer coordination, greater efficiency----especially as ISAF expands into the South and the East." nations must have time to define these words in the same way before substantive action can be taken, but in NATO words and how they are used is the first step in the process of creating a shared vision which over time translates into a common objective which is resourced with money and manpower.
As far as US national interests are concerned and in light of the National Security Strategy, continued robust international involvement in the development of Afghanistan as a free and viable nation is crucial. It is in the US interest that NATO and other troop contributing nations are allowed the flexibility to define 'stability' as broadly as necessary to ensure their continued efforts in the region. Further, the US must encourage the development of the idea of 'linkage' between ISAF and OEF in the coming months as NATO develops the next phase of its strategy in Afghanistan. Ideally, the merger (or 'linkage') of ISAF and OEF into one strategic headquarters suits the US interests best since it will allow for continued US access to and influence of military operations in the region without the current levels of troop and resource commitments in Afghanistan. The synergy created by linking both operations would improve the international unity of effort and facilitate the physical reconstruction process. It will allow for the US to reinvest those assets elsewhere as America continues its Global War on Terror.
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